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Liberty and. Equality Under the Religion Clauses 
of the First Amendment 
Kenneth W. Starr* 
The dynamic between liberty and equality may be observed 
in the dialogue among the Justices of the Supreme Court, 
especially in recent Religion Clause cases. At the outset, it is 
useful to recall the newness of this Court. Since 1986, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist has been elevated to his present 
responsibility and four new Justices have joined the Court. For 
the Supreme Court, seven years is a relatively brief period; but 
during this period the Court has become unstable, especially 
since the departures of Justices Brennan and Marshall. Their 
views on a wide range of issues were not and, most likely, will 
not be accepted by any of the six Justices appointed or elevated 
during the 1980s and 1990s.' While Justices Breman and 
Marshall sat on the Court, their liberal jurisprudence tended to 
drive those more centrist and conservative Justices into one 
another's arms. Their departure seems to  have had a 
balkanizing effect, magnified by the activity of the ever- 
questioning Justice Scalia. The result has been a series of 
splintered decisions with only one UnlEylng theme-~urprise.~ 
Recent years have also witnessed vigorous debate within 
the Court about the themes of liberty and equality, especially 
the efficacy of equality in rebuffing free exercise challenges. In 
Employment Division v. Smith,3 Justice Scalia championed the 
no-special-favors approach. He relied on equality of legal 
* From 1989 t o  1993, Judge Starr, formerly a member of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sewed as Solicitor General 
of the United States. 
1. For example, no one on the Court would embrace the position that capital 
punishment is unconstitutional under any and all circumstances. That view, which 
Justices Brennan and Marshall embraced so vigorously and with such moral force 
in case &r case, notwithstanding the concerns of stare decisis, clearly struck 
those with more moderate impulses as extreme. 
2. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Lee v. 
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). 
3. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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applicability to rebut the suggestion that special exemptions, or 
at least a fair accommodation of religious liberty and 
expression, were needed in order to permit religious beliefs to 
be translated into action. As Justice Scalia saw it, the 
democratic process must be permitted to work. As long as they 
discipline themselves through the equality principle, 
legislatures must be permitted to act and legislate in an  across- 
the-board fashion4-no special favors, tempered by the golden 
rule. In  fashioning this result, concerns over judicial 
competence and power guided Justice Scalia and the majority 
to invoke such ancient no-special-favors cases as Reynolds v. 
United States5 and, ironically, Justice Frankfurter's short-lived 
triumph in Minersville School District v. Gobitis: the classic 
no-special-favors case. Relying on the no-special-favors 
rationale, Justice Scalia wrote: 
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long 
struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from 
obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or 
restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of 
religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of 
a political society does not relieve the citizen from the 
discharge of political responsibilities.' 
All are equal under the law with no favors or dispensations. 
Religious minorities need not fear, according to Justice 
Scalia, because democracy works. Arizona, Colorado, and New 
Mexico, states with significant Native American populations, 
had each crafted statutory exceptions for the sacramental use 
of peyote.' The implicit message of assurance was that Oregon 
would likely follow suit once the press had publicized the plight 
of the Native American Church member~hip.~ Gone forever, 
Justice Scalia and the majority seem to be saying, are the bad 
old days in Oregon when the Oregon legislature might decide, 
in a fit of anti-Catholic fervor, to effectively abolish parochial 
schools through generally applicable legi~lation.'~ 
4. Id. at 879-82. 
5. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
6. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
7. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Gobitis, 310 US. at 594-95). 
8. See ARE. REV. STAT. ANN. # 13-3402(B)(1)-(2) (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. 
$ 12-22-317(3) (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. 8 30-31-60) (Michie Supp. 1989). 
9. Oregon has since enacted an exemption for the sacramental use of peyote. 
See OR. REV. STAT. 8 475.992(5) (1991). 
10. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). As an aside, Judge 
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In Smith, the principle of equality was employed to defeat 
a liberty claim under the Free Exercise Clause. However, this 
result should not mask two benefits that flow from a judicially 
enforced equality regime. The fmst is illustrated by the Equal 
Access Act," passed in the wake of Widmr  u. Vincent.12 
Widmar established that religiously based clubs may hold 
activities on university grounds on an equal basis with other 
extracurricular groups. Equality is such a powerN normative 
principle that a broad political consensus can be achieved in  
favor of a nondiscrimination measure. Warring factions on 
Capitol Hill with respect to voluntary prayer in public schools 
came together under the equality banner in overwhelming 
bipartisan support of equal access. As demonstrated by Board 
of Education v. Mergens,13 students who attend public high 
schools now enjoy federal statutory protection if they desire to 
engage voluntarily in Bible study groups, so long as the school 
permits any extracurricular clubs to operate. 
Equality can thus be quite protective of fkee exercise 
values when an assault on religious expression or activity in 
public institutions is premised, as is frequently the case, on 
Establishment Clause grounds. With the public mind, and to a 
great extent the judicial mind, fdled with images of 
Jeffersonian metaphors of high impregnable walls,'* the 
equality principle is a useful tool for those who believe that  
they have been singled out for disparately unfavorable 
treatment because of their religious beliefs. The unsuccessful 
effort of the Lamb's Chapel group in New York State to show 
the Turn Your Heart Toward Home fdm series on public school 
premises during the evening hours illustrates this point rather 
nicely. l5 
Bork, responding to concerns over his approach to substantive due process during 
his confirmation hearings in 1987, suggested that the Oregon law of general 
applicability requiring all students to attend schools created and operated by the 
state could perhaps be invalidated under the Free Exercise Clause. 14 THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL 
AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE 
JUDICIARY C O M M ~ E E  1916-1987, at  190, 352 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron 
Jacobstein comps., 1990); see also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some 
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 11 (1971). 
11. Pub. L. No. 98-377 8 802, 98 Stat. 1302 (codified at  20 U.S.C. 8 4071 
(1988)). 
12. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
13. 496 US. 226 (1990). 
14. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2668-76 (1992) (Souter, J., 
concurring); Reynolds v. United States, 98 US. 145, 164 (1878). 
15. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381 (2d 
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The second advantage of the equality principle is entirely 
practical. As Justice Scalia pointed out in Smith, turning our 
growing religious pluralism and diversity to his advantage, a 
diverse people "cannot afford the luxury of deeming 
presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every 
regulation of conduct that does not protect an  interest of the 
highest order."16 A related point, for those skeptical of the 
capacity of the judiciary to engage in a principled and 
consistent superintendence of the democratic process through 
an  accommodation analysis, is that legislatures are more likely 
to be aware of, and perhaps even sensitive to, the need to 
protect minority religious practices. Under this anti- 
Madisonian view, it is no longer politically acceptable to 
persecute minorities. 
The response to all of this may well be, "So what?" The 
equality principle may be useful to prevent the excesses of the 
Westside School Districts of the world, with their legal advisors 
counseling them to throw Bridget Mergens and her Bible study 
group off campus," but it certainly does not help the Amish of 
Wisconsin keep alive their religious traditions in a secular 
age,'' nor does it permit religiously inspired home education. 
Religious liberty is left virtually unprotected in this age of 
secularist-dominated legislation and regulation. 
One can thus reflect on Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith 
with a sense of constitutional wonderment. Have I somehow 
entered a Narnian world, in which the Turkish delight of 
equality masks a wintry world where some very evil things are 
going on?'' Could it be that communion wine for Roman 
Catholics, or animal sacrifices for adherents of Santeria, both 
venerable practices going to the heart of religious belief and 
expression, nonetheless depend on the sufferance of the 
majority? So what if Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico permit 
the sacramental use of peyote? Although this permission exists 
today, the winds of democracy can change. Skinheads, neo- 
Nazis, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, and political turmoil in 
Russia all remind us of the fragdity of democracy. As Donald 
Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). 
16. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990). 
17. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 US. 226 (1990). 
18. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205 (1972). 
19. Cf. C.S. LEWIS, THE LION, THE W ~ H ,  AND THE WARDROBE (New York 
Deluxe ed. 1983) (1950). 
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Kagan has eloquently reminded us, "[democracy] is . . . one of 
the rarest, most delicate and fragile flowers in the jungle of 
himan e~perience."~~ Democracy today may be flowering in 
Latin America and elsewhere, but can we say with confidence 
that the racial hatred demonstrated recently in Los Angeles 
and Crown Heights is not a harbinger of really nasty things to  
come here at home? 
In this sobering context, Justice O'Connor's voice is raised 
in favor of keeping the judicial watchdog out in the yard and on 
duty, barking and occasionally biting at  the majoritarian heel. 
Equality alone, she urges, is a hollow promise, the stuff of 
Orwellian worlds. Equality without more is a snare, a delusion. 
It is, in essence, a full-scale Daryl Gates-style retreat from the 
battlefront. So trust the judiciary, she would urge, as a coequal 
keeper of the constitutional flame of liberty. 
Perhaps both sides of the debate should calm down and 
lower the rhetorical level. But religious liberty, which some of 
us thought was at stake in Lee u. Wei~man,~~ is such an 
important part of the history and tradition of the American 
people that the level will probably remain quite high.22 In Lee 
u. Weisman the Court viewed the record as partaking of the 
same nature as state-ordered prayer in Engel u. Vitale.23 This 
is not the only reasonable way of looking at the record. I 
submit as Exhibit A Judge Levin Campbell's very thoughtful 
dissent characterizing graduation prayer as an act of religious 
liberty and an appeal to the traditions of an historically 
religious people: 
I suspect that most Americans of all persuasions-including 
the increasing numbers who adhere to religions or ethical 
systems outside the Judeo-Christian framework-find it is 
appropriate and meaningful for public speakers to invoke the 
deity not as an expression of a particular sectarian belief but 
as an expression of transcendent values and of the mystery 
and idealism so absent from much of modern cu1tu.1-e.24 
20. DONALD KAGAN, PERICLES OF ATHENS AND THE BIRTH OF DEMOCRACY 2 
(1991). 
21. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). 
22. This point was illustrated nicely by President Clinton's choice, as an ad of 
religious liberty, to generously quote from scripture in his inaugural address and 
his decision to invite the Reverend Billy Graham to deliver a prayer asking for 
God's blessings on a free people. 
23. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
24. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1098-99 (1st Cir. 1980) (Campbell, J., 
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But a t  the same time, the Supreme Court made it clear in  
Weisman that the State cannot be in the business of 
suppressing the prayers of an historically religious people. And 
thus, it would be too much, as some of my fiends in the 
Academy would do, to say that there can be no prayer at 
graduation ceremonies. A carem reading of Justice Kennedy's 
opinion, I believe, suggests sensitivity to the concern that 
religious liberty must be protected, as well as a Madisonian 
concern for the right of individuals not to participate, to enjoy 
the freedom of conscience. This was captured in  the modern era 
by Justice Jackson in West virginia- Board of Education v. 
B ~ r n e t t e ~ ~ :  
The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw 
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, 
to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and 
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the 
courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, 
a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other 
fbndamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they 
depend on the outcome of no e l e~ t ions .~~  
The vision of the liberty of the individual has never been 
expressed more eloquently than i t  was in Barnette, the case 
that overruled Gobitis, which, ironically, Justice Scalia saw fit 
to invoke in Smith.27 
Rejected was the egalitarian, some would say statist, model 
of Gobitis. Maybe, just maybe, constitutional history is about to 
repeat itself. 
dissenting), affd, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); see also Stein v. Plainwell Community 
Sch., 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987) (upholding nonsectarian prayers at a public 
school graduation). 
25. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
26. Id. at 638. 
27. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (citing Gobitis). 
